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Abstract 
 
A substantial body of theoretical and case study literature exists about the 
relationship between competition and universal service in developing countries. On the 
one hand, many scholars have argued that state-owned monopolies in developing 
countries are not able to mobilize the capital needed for network expansion: the resulting 
unmet demand for services becomes a motivator for liberalization. On the other hand, the 
introduction of competition jeopardizes the internal and external subsidies through which 
the state-owned monopoly kept subscription rates low: the heightened concern about loss 
of subscribership incentivizes the creation of explicit universal service statutes and 
funding mechanisms concurrently with or soon after competition is introduced. We show 
in this case study that universal service in Korea had a unique evolutionary path, which 
did not conform to either of these expectations. We argue that the outcomes predicted by 
theory and observed in the case study literature are not intrinsic to the monopoly 
condition per se, but derive from the strategic choices made by telecommunications 
managers, regulators and lawmakers in developing countries. 
 
KEYWORDS: universal service; Korea; network growth; competition; liberalization; 
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The impact of competition on universal service in Korea: A case study 
 
Introduction 
Since the 1980s, a broad consensus has emerged in the literature that the 
introduction of market-oriented reforms is the most effective means to achieve 
telecommunications objectives such as productivity and efficiency, network expansion 
and universal service (e.g., Bhuiyan, 2004; Fan, 2005; Garbacz & Thompson, 2007; 
Mueller, 1999; Ros, 1997; 1999; Stehmann, 1995; Wallsten, 2001). Developing countries 
seeking operational efficiency and network growth are encouraged to introduce market-
oriented reforms, such as competition and privatization, which are expected to solve the 
inherent problems of a state monopoly. Accordingly, most major developing countries 
have implemented some form of reform in the past two decades, dismantling monopoly 
state ownership and control over telecommunications.  
In this paper, our primary concern is with the impact of competition on universal 
service. Theoretical explications and cross-national comparisons have been conducted 
over the past two decades, assessing this relationship. These case studies reveal a general 
―pattern‖ to the process of reform (Bhuiyan, 2004; Cowhey & Klimenko, 2000; Gillwald, 
2005; Mattos & Coutinho, 2005; Serafica, 1996). Typically, calls for reform are initiated 
when state monopolies in developing countries fail to meet residents‘ demands for 
telecommunications service because of their inefficiency and the lack of financial 
resources for network investment (see in general, Wallsten, 2001; Cowhey and Klimenko, 
2000). These consumer demands for better service are accompanied by pressure from 
private investors, domestic and international, for investment opportunities in markets that 
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are seen as lucrative. Under these influences, the government opens the 
telecommunications sector to private capital either through privatization of the state-
owned operator, or by allowing private telecommunications carriers to enter 
competitively with the incumbent. Universal service, which is often conceptualized as a 
―social‖ objective, is typically not high up in the priorities in this first phase of reform, 
which is principally motivated by pro-market considerations. However, the first phase 
often involves increases in subscriber rates to attract private capital, and rate rebalancing 
and removal of cross-subsidies to prepare the incumbent monopoly for competition 
(Mattos & Coutinho, 2005). Widespread fears that universal service may be sacrificed for 
economic efficiency tend to ignite discussions of universal service (Jayakar, 1999; 
Mueller, 1997). Any ad hoc universal service system that may have existed earlier is 
replaced by an explicit, transparent and competitively neutral support mechanism for 
low-income subscribers or high-cost areas. Though individual countries may differ in 
significant ways from this typical pattern, the general process is repeatedly observed in 
countries as different as, for example Brazil (Mattos & Coutinho, 2005), Chile (Stehmann, 
1995), India (Petrazzini, 1996), South Africa (Gillward, 2005) and Bangladesh (Bhuiyan, 
2004). 
These patterns of telecommunications reform, typical of most developing 
countries, are not evident in the case of South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea). As 
we shall show in the paper, Korea was able to achieve substantial network penetration 
during the monopoly period, contrary to the experience of other developing countries and 
the expectations from theory. Second, the introduction of competition was an abnormally 
prolonged process in Korea occupying the better part of a decade. But it was not 
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accompanied by demands for a new universal service system, contrary to the experience 
in other developing countries where competition led to the end of the incumbent 
monopoly‘s cross-subsidy support for local service and contributed to demands for a new 
competitively neutral universal service system. Instead, in Korea, demands for a new 
universal service system emerged only in the late 1990s, almost a decade after 
competition was introduced. Moreover, the universal service mechanism that appeared in 
2000 was still not competitively neutral. It imposed the obligation of universal service 
largely on the incumbent, Korea Telecom. Also, despite the lack of specific universal 
service funding mechanisms, Korea initiated an ambitious universal service program for 
broadband from the mid-1990s—many years before more developed economies took a 
similar step.   
In light of these anomalies, several questions may be posed. How was Korea able 
to dramatically expand the network in the state monopoly period without significant 
private capital investment? In introducing competition, why did the Korean government 
adopt a deliberately slow and phased manner, despite enormous pressure from 
international actors? Why did Korean universal service policy, for long administered by 
government fiat, suddenly acquire a legal foundation and a systematic framework in the 
late 1990s? In contrast to the experience of many countries, why was Korea so quickly 
able to develop a universal service policy for broadband? Again in contrast to most other 
countries, how was Korea able to build rural broadband networks almost simultaneously 
with networks in urban areas? How did the introduction of competition and privatization 
change the dynamics of universal service policy-making?  
To find answers to these questions, this paper investigates the introduction of 
 5 
 
competition in Korea and its relationship to the evolution of a universal service system. 
We build on a substantial case study literature on telecommunications reform in Korea 
(Choi, 1999; Hong, 1998; Hyun & Lent, 1999; Jin, 2006; Jung, 1997; Kim 2003; Koh, 
2001; Yoon, 1999), but we argue that many of the anomalies identified above may be 
explained in relation to the changing motivations and consequent behavior of one of the 
principal actors in the Korean telecommunications industry, namely Korea Telecom. We 
will argue that the evolution of universal service policies in Korea took a distinctive path 
because of critical decisions taken by Korea Telecom and the government in the pre-
reform period. We further argue that Korea Telecom continued to be the main vehicle for 
the implementation of the government‘s universal service policies while competition was 
being introduced in stages, between 1991 and 1998. The situation began to change only 
with the privatization of Korea Telecom in 2002. Accordingly, our case study covers the 
period from 1987 to 2002. The next two sections discuss respectively the monopoly 
period, and the introduction of competition in Korea beginning in the early 1990s. The 
evolution of universal service policies is then taken up, and the conclusions thereafter. 
As a case study on the ―temporal sequencing‖ of events (Mahoney, 2000, p. 509) 
within a limited time-frame, our objective in this paper is limited to analyzing the 
dynamics of competition and universal service during the 15-year span from 1987 to 
2002. Less attention is given to consequential events such as the privatization of Korea 
Telecom and the intense competition that was to develop in broadband in the 21
st
 century, 
because our main concern is with examining the dynamics of universal service in a 
system with a dominant state-controlled telecommunications provider.  
Network expansion during the monopoly period 
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As stated in the introduction, the consensus in theory and the case study literature 
is that state-owned monopolies in developing countries are not able to achieve rapid 
network deployment due to resource constraints and managerial inefficiencies. The lack 
of financial resources is compounded by the well-intentioned but counter-productive 
effort of many states to make telephone subscriptions affordable through artificially low 
rates. As a result, the telecommunications company is not able to mobilize the resources 
to deploy the network, even as demand skyrockets: long waiting lists are the result. 
Demand management becomes an administrative exercise, through rationing of telephone 
connections with all the attendant potential for corruption and abuse.  
Korea in the state-monopoly period managed to avoid this dilemma by adopting a 
distinctive approach to network deployment. The country achieved increases in 
teledensity as well as regionally balanced network expansion before liberalization was 
introduced. This was done through two interrelated policy choices: first, two programs of 
network growth, the Immediate Telephone Installation System (ITIS) and the Widening 
and Automation (WA) program, were implemented; and second, the state mobilized 
domestic capital through higher subscription rates and the issue of telephone bonds. 
These two choices are discussed in greater detail in the sections below.  
 
Network expansion programs 
In most countries, telecommunications policies at the early stage of the network 
growth tended to target teledensity rather than regionally balanced network expansion 
(Gordon & Haring, 1984). Unlike other countries, however, Korea introduced two 
ambitious network expansion programs, the Immediate Telephone Installation System (IT 
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IS) and the Widening and Automation (WA) program, during the state-owned monopoly 
period, which didn‘t aim at merely teledensity increases but pursued regionally balanced 
network expansion as well. These two policies, particularly the WA, were designed to 
address the problem of the gap between urban and rural areas which emerged as a 
political and social issue starting in the late 1970s (Kim & Lee, 1991). 
As explained well in previous works (Kim, 2003; Kim & Lee, 1991; Koh, 2001; 
Korea Telecom, 2001; MOC, 1988), the ITIS was designed to expand transmission 
networks and to provide high-capacity switching equipment and largely contributed to 
teledensity growth. The WA simultaneously pursued two separate telecommunications 
policies, widening of local zones and subscription zones
1
 and automation of switching. 
The WA greatly contributed to the growth of telephone subscriptions in rural areas and 
played a major role in achieving regionally balanced network expansion by lowering the 
cost of usage and access for rural telephone subscribers and improving service to rural 
areas. Specifically, the WA widened local call zones enabling residents in rural areas to 
call nearby urban areas at cheaper rates than before, because calls that had earlier been 
classified as long distance were now local. Additionally, the WA gave a higher priority to 
the automation of switching in rural areas with the result that by 1987 service in some 
rural areas was fully digitalized with electronic switches, even as some urban areas 
continued to be served with electromechanical switches. This enabled residents in rural 
areas to enjoy better quality of telephone service than those in urban areas (Kim, 2003; 
Kim & Lee, 1991; Korea Telecom, 2001). 
As a result of these two telecommunications policies, teledensity growth 
                                            
1
 Local call zones and subscription zones refer to zones in which the same local call rates and subscription 
charges were applied, respectively (cited in Kim & Lee, 1991, p. 36). 
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significantly increased and the total number of telephone subscribers reached 10 million 
in 1987. This implies that the number of telephone subscriptions increased at the pace of 
about a million a year from 1981 to 1987. By 1992, the number of telephone subscribers 
reached 17 million and Korea ranked as the ninth top nation in the world in terms of the 
number of telephone subscriptions. Further, regionally balanced network expansion, 
energetically pursued by the Korean government with a slogan of ‗One Household, One 
Telephone‘ in the 1980s, was also successfully achieved. Thus, telephone service was 
provided to almost all households, even in rural areas, mountainous regions and isolated 
islands before competition was introduced in the 1990s (Kim, 2003; Kim & Lee, 1991; 
Koh, 2001; Korea Telecom, 2001; MOC, 1988). 
 
Utilizing domestically raised capital for network investment   
Korea adopted strategies for financing network expansion and teledensity growth 
different from that of other developing countries. In particular, contrary to other 
developing countries that embraced competition, or allowed foreign investment, or 
privatized state-owned telecommunications enterprises to raise the huge capital needed 
for network expansion, Korea achieved network expansion and teledensity growth largely 
utilizing domestically raised capital in the monopoly era.  
First, beginning in 1979, the Korean government started a policy of requiring all 
new telephone subscribers to buy telephone bonds as a condition for obtaining a 
connection. These government bonds might be thought of as a substitute for installation 
fees, with the difference that they paid interest to bondholders and were redeemable on 
maturation. Second, the government raised local call rates by 66% from 12 won 
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(approximately 12 cents) to 20 won (approximately 20 cents) in 1981 to help the state-
owned monopoly‘s financial position and to accumulate capital needed for implementing 
the IT IS and the WA. While rate increases have been controversial in other countries, 
Korea in the 1960s-70s was growing rapidly and customers were able to afford the 
steeply raised telephone service rates. Also, the huge pent-up demand for connections 
made the rate increases more acceptable to consumers. Through these two moves, the 
Korea Telecom Authority (KTA - as Korea Telecom was formerly called) was able to 
domestically finance the huge capital requirements for the development of the 
telecommunications sector. As Table 1 indicates, the KTA‘s internal financing2 for its 
total investment, including network expansion, increased from 44.9% in 1981 to 75.9% in 
1987 due to a series of rate hikes, while funding from foreign investors decreased to 0% 
from 20.1% during the same period. Once regionally balanced network expansion was 
successfully achieved by the end of this period, the requirement to buy telephone bonds 
was withdrawn and rural telephone service rates were re-adjusted in 1988 (Kim, 2003; 
Kim & Lee, 1991; Koh, 2001; Korea Telecom, 2001; MOC, 1988). 
 
(Table 1 goes here) 
 
Thus, the liberalization of the 1990s was not motivated by unmet demand for 
domestic service, and network expansion and universal service were not primary goals of 
telecommunications reform. Instead, competition was introduced primarily under 
international pressure for investment opportunities. 
 
                                            
2
 This refers to the part of the KTA budget that came from telecommunications revenues. 
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Introduction of competition in Korean telecommunications 
In the late 1980s, the Korean government came under enormous pressure from 
foreign players including the United States to open its telecommunications sector to 
competition (Choi, 1999; Hong, 1998; Hyun & Lent, 1999; Jin, 2006; Jung, 1997; Kim 
2003; Koh, 2001; Yoon, 1999). In response, Korea began to introduce competition in 
telecommunications with the first structural adjustment in 1991. The government 
introduced partial competition to the international call, mobile service, and wireless pager 
markets and opened the value added service market to full competition. Specifically, 
DACOM, a second international call carrier, began to compete with Korea Telecom in 
December, 1991, and ten service providers were newly invited into the wireless pager 
market in August, 1992. In addition, Shinsegi Tongshin, a second mobile service carrier, 
began to provide mobile service in July, 1994 in competition with SK Telecom
3
 (Hong, 
1998; Koh, 2001). The emergence of new telecommunications service carriers finally put 
an end to Korea Telecom‘s monopoly that had lasted over one hundred years. 
In spite of the introduction of competition in these new services, the first 
structural adjustment stopped far short of introducing full-fledged competition. Foreign 
players as well as domestic conglomerates continued to push the Korean government to 
invite more competition after the first structural adjustment because the Korean 
telecommunications market was very attractive to them. Thus, the government carried out 
the second structural adjustment in telecommunication in 1994, and opened the long-
distance call market to competition. DACOM was licensed as a second long-distance call 
service provider in March, 1995. Additionally, new telecommunications services, such as 
                                            
3
 SK Telecom originated as Korea Mobile Telecom owned by Korea Telecom; in January 1994, Korea 
Mobile Telecom was privatized and sold to Sunkyung, one of Korea‘s big conglomerates, and was renamed 
SK Telecom 
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PCS (Personal Communications Service) and TRS (Trunked Radio System), were 
introduced (Hong, 1998; Koh, 2001).  
In 1995, one year after the second structural adjustment, the Korean government 
announced ‗A Blueprint to Improve Competitiveness of the Telecommunications 
Industry‘ and conducted the third structural adjustment in telecommunications. Like the 
two previous adjustments, this reform also aimed at improving the competitiveness of 
domestic carriers against foreign telecommunications service providers, prior to the 
introduction of full-scale competition to the telecommunications market—a key 
requirement if the WTO basic telecommunications negotiations were to reach an 
agreement. In the third structural adjustment based on the Blueprint, the Korean 
government licensed twenty-seven new service providers in 1996 and introduced 
competition to all telecommunications markets except the local-call market (Hong, 1998; 
Kim, 2003; Koh, 2001). 
The WTO basic telecommunications negotiations finally reached an agreement in 
February, 1997. Consequently, the Korean government began the fourth structural 
adjustment in telecommunications in the same year, which aimed at more competition 
among domestic carriers as well as deregulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
telecommunications in the preparation for full liberalization of its telecommunications 
market. As a result, Hanaro-Tongshin was licensed as a second local call service carrier 
and local-call market was opened to competition in 1998. By this step, Korea completed 
the process of the introduction of competition to its telecommunications market (Hong, 
1998; Kim, 2003, Koh, 2001). 
The key feature of the last two structural adjustments during the period of 1995 ~ 
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1997 was the transition to a fully-competitive market, which had been largely controlled 
and managed by the government until then, even though the first two structural 
adjustments had liberalized some sectors selectively. In particular, the third structural 
adjustment had three major slogans: ‗diffusion of competition‘, ‗enhancement of 
competitiveness of Korea Telecom‘ and ‗implementation of competitively neutral market‘ 
(Hwang, 1999; Koh, 2001). 
Though pressure from foreign players induced the Korean government to 
liberalize its telecommunications market, the government managed to retain control over 
the pace and specifics of reform (Yoon, 1999). For example, despite pressure from the 
United States and others to fully open its telecommunications market to competition, the 
government made its own master plan to introduce competition and new services to the 
telecommunications sector step-by-step. According to many commentators, one of the 
government‘s main objectives seems to have been to protect its telecommunications 
industry from foreign competitors (Hong, 1998; Kim, 2003; Yoon, 1999). As a result, 
competition among domestic service providers was gradually introduced in the initial 
phase of market-oriented reform before foreign competitors were allowed to come in. 
Even as enough reforms were implemented to defuse pressure from international actors 
for quick action on liberalization, the Korean government ensured that domestic service 
providers will have an opportunity to enhance their productivity and competitiveness.  
What aided the government‘s autonomy in structuring the timetable for the 
introduction of competition in spite of international pressure? Part of the reason was the 
absence of significant pressure from consumers for better service—one of the principal 
reasons why developing countries are impelled toward telecommunications reform. 
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During the era of a state owned telecommunications enterprise in the 1980s, Korea had 
managed to expand the telecommunications network while simultaneously promoting 
universal service—a difficult balance to achieve since the rate controls and cross-
subsidies often used for universal service inhibit network investment. This was the result 
of a unique partnership between the state and Korea Telecom, but the net effect was that 
Korea had achieved significant teledensity growth and balanced regional development 
even before competition was introduced. As a result, pressure from consumers was not a 
significant factor behind the decision to introduce telecommunications reforms. 
 
Universal Service in Korea 
The high degree of network development achieved during the monopoly period 
resulted in a unique evolutionary path for universal service in Korea. For one, the 
introduction of competition in Korea didn‘t spark demands for universal service programs, 
nor was competition advocated as a means of furthering universal service. Indeed, the 
discourse around the introduction of competition had very little to say on universal 
service, either in a positive way that competition will aid universal service or negatively 
that social objectives like universal service will be sacrificed in a competitive market. As 
a result, it took eight years after competition was invited to the Korean 
telecommunications market for the term ―universal service‖ to appear in official 
documents— in the Telecommunication Business Act (TBA) revised in September, 1998. 
In other words, universal service emerged in the policy discourse only after the phased 
introduction of competition was mostly completed, and not during the eight-year period 
when competition was gradually introduced. This section traces the evolution of the 
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universal service concept in Korean telecommunications policy during the monopoly 
period and beyond. Additionally, we discuss why the introduction of competition had less 
impact on universal service in Korea, compared to the case of other countries. 
Few telecommunications laws in Korea had provisions related to universal service 
prior to the late-1990s; and where such references existed, they were in the nature of 
general statements of intent, not requiring specific policies or programs. The earliest 
telecommunications law to mention universal service was the KTA Act in 1981, which 
stated that ―the KTA should contribute to promotion of the public interest such as the 
interests of people and social welfare through reasonable and responsible operation.‖ and 
that ―the KTA should strive to provide all the people with telecommunications service in 
equitable and convenient ways.‖ The 1991 revision of the TBA had a more specific 
reference to universal service: Article 3 stated that ―telecommunications service providers 
must not refuse to provide telecommunications service without fair and legitimate 
reasons.‖ In addition, Article 29 of the same act indicated that ―telecommunications 
service should be provided at reasonable rates, in order not only to promote the 
development of the telecommunications sector, but also to provide residents with a 
variety of telecommunications services conveniently and fairly at cheap prices.‖  
With no other guideline passed with the introduction of competition, the status 
quo ante prevailed and the state-owned telecommunications enterprise was still obliged to 
provide all people with telecommunications. Cross-subsidies within the state-owned 
telecommunications sector continued as before. Kim (2003) points out that ―(the laws) 
didn‘t reflect changes in market structure caused by the introduction of competition, nor 
did they make mention of how to operate the universal service mechanism‖ (p. 122~123). 
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This situation continued until the TBA was revised and the Ministerial Ordinance of the 
Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) was enacted in 1998. 
Though there was no statutory framework for universal service until the late 
1990s, Korea did have an informal universal service system in place. The distinguishing 
characteristics of this system were a partnership between the government and Korea 
Telecom, and the expectation that the latter would continue to be asymmetrically 
burdened in carrying out the policies and programs of the government. First of all, in 
spite of the emergence of new telecommunications providers, Korea Telecom was 
designated as the sole universal service provider in local phone service, local public 
phone service, isolated area communication service, and wireless phone service for ships. 
This is because the other telecommunications service providers argued successfully that 
companies other than Korea Telecom will not be able to provide these services nationally. 
Only in some limited categories of service did the new carriers such as SK Telecom, 
Hanaro Telecom, and DACOM share the burden with Korea Telecom: for emergency 
phone service, exempted and reduced fee services for low income citizens and the 
handicapped (Jeong, 2004; Kim, 2003; Korea Telecom, 2001).  
The asymmetric burden placed on Korea Telecom changed little even after the 
transition to competition was completed by 1998. As stated previously, the Ministerial 
Ordinance that year revised the Telecommunications Business Act (TBA) to explicitly 
define universal service for the first time. In 2000, a new universal service mechanism 
was introduced pursuant to the Ordinance that extended subsidy support for the services 
for which Korea Telecom was the sole universal service provider: namely, local phone 
service, local public phone service, isolated area communication service, and wireless 
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phone service for ships. But under the computation methods use for universal service fees, 
Korea Telecom‘s losses incurred by universal service would not be fully compensated for 
by the government or other service providers. According to the Ministerial Ordinance, 
service providers which experience losses from providing universal service may be 
subsidized by the government or other service providers for the following services: 1) 
local call service whose ratio of the required cost to revenue is more than 110:100, 2) 
local public phone service for which the ratio of the required cost to revenue is more than 
130:100, 3) isolated area communication service, 4) wireless phone service for ships. In 
effect, universal service providers are not subsidized for local call service for which the 
costs exceed revenue by less than 10 percent, or for local public phone service when the 
excess of costs over revenue is less than 30 percent. Additionally, even in the case of 
local call service whose ratio of the required cost to revenue is more than 110:100 (and 
for public phone service where the costs to revenue ratio is more than 130:100), the 
service provider‘s losses are equated (for computational purposes) to 90% of its actual 
losses caused by the service, on the argument that the service provider gets intangible 
benefits by providing universal service. Further, only 70% of these imputed losses are 
considered as the amount which may be subsidized. In spite of these several steps of 
computation, however, the losses incurred by providing local call service to high cost 
areas are not compensated for if the universal service provider makes profits from its 
local call service as a whole. For public phone service as well, no compensation is 
provided if the universal service provider makes profits from its public phone service as a 
whole (Jeong, 2004).  
In the case of isolated area communication service, the Ministerial Ordinance 
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limits compensation to the losses incurred for installation of wireless transmission 
devices for providing local call service to isolated areas. Additionally, the amount which 
may be subsidized is limited to 90% of these losses. For wireless phone service for ships, 
the universal service provider‘s losses had been fully compensated until 2003. But since 
2004, its losses from providing wireless phone service for ships have been computed by 
Long-Run Incremental Costs (LRIC) because the government expected this method to 
prevent the universal service provider from imposing the costs incurred by its 
inefficiency on other service providers (Jeong, 2004; Kim, 2003).    
The negative impact of these computations has fallen entirely on Korea Telecom, 
the sole universal service provider for the four services mentioned above, preventing it 
from being fairly subsidized for universal service. As Table 2 indicates, Korea Telecom‘s 
actual losses incurred by providing local call service to high cost areas were $2128.3 
million during 2000~2005, but they were equated to $200.4 million (9.4% of the total 
losses) in the process of computation. As a result, Korea Telecom was subsidized $135.2 
million (6.4% of the total losses) from other service providers. This represented the net 
subsidy receipts of Korea Telecom, after Korea Telecom‘s own share of the total 
universal service support was subtracted from the total subsidies it was eligible to receive. 
Additionally, as Table 3 notes, Korea Telecom‘s actual losses from providing public 
phone service were $668.5 million during the same period, but they were equated to 
$253.3 million (37.9% of the total losses). And, Korea Telecom was subsidized $171.8 
million (25.7% of the total losses) from other service providers after its own contributions 
were deducted from the eligible subsidy. In other words, Korea Telecom paid 93.6% of 
the total losses from providing local call service to high cost areas and paid 74.3 % of the 
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total losses incurred by public phone service during the period of 2000~2005 (Korea 
Telecom, 2007). 
(Table 2 goes here) 
 
 
(Table 3 goes here) 
 
 
Overall, as Table 4 below shows, Korea Telecom‘s total losses incurred from 
providing four types of universal service—local call service, public phone service, 
isolated area communication service, wireless phone service for ships—were $2991.8 
million
4
 during the period of 2000~2005. However, they were equated to $635.2 million 
(21.2% of the total losses) after computation. As a result, Korea Telecom was subsidized 
$428.6 million (14.3% of the total losses) from other service providers after the levy 
imposed on Korea Telecom was subtracted from the computed losses of $635.2 million. 
This implies that Korea Telecom paid 85.7% of the total losses incurred by providing four 
types of universal service during the period of 2000~2005 (Korea Telecom, 2007). As a 
result, Korea Telecom‘s losses incurred by universal service have not been fairly and 
symmetrically compensated even after full-scale competition was introduced. 
 
(Table 4 goes here) 
 
As discussed so far, the universal service mechanism initiated after the 
introduction of full-scale competition mainly focuses on the computation of 
compensation for the losses from providing four different categories of service. 
                                            
4
 This is the sum of the total from Table 3 ($2128.3 million) plus the total from Table 4 ($668.5 million) 
plus losses for isolated area communication service, and wireless phone service for ships.  
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Paradoxically, the lacunae in the then-existing models for universal telephone service did 
not prevent the Korean government from extending universal service programs to new 
technologies such as the Internet. Consequently, the development of a national 
information infrastructure and universal service for the Internet were also initiated and 
promoted largely by the government-run telecommunications service provider. The 
repetition of the same pattern of reliance on the former monopoly carrier to implement 
government policy indicates that the pattern is a deliberate strategy. The next section 
discusses the extension of universal access programs to the internet. 
 
Universal access and the Internet 
In 1995, the Korean government initiated a master plan labeled the Korean 
Information Infrastructure (KII) Project to build an information superhighway. Korea 
Telecom was appointed as the key agency with full responsibility for the project, 
including a major share of the project cost, as well as for the development of technologies 
and equipment to build the information superhighway, in partnership with ETRI 
(Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute) and KAIST (Korea Advanced 
Institute of Science & Technology). In terms of financing the project, the government 
required Korea Telecom to provide initial support of $23.1 million which was more than 
70 percent of the seed capital cost of the project. Under the KII Project, a broadband 
network based on ATM (Asynchronous Transmission Mode) switches and fiber optic 
lines was constructed beginning in April, 1996 (Korea Telecom, 2001). 
In addition, complying with the government‘s request, Korea Telecom established 
a master plan to convert its Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) to fiber optic 
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lines with ATM switches all across the country by 2015. The government announced in 
1997 that Korea Telecom would be charged with almost all the expenses of $4.5 billion 
for the project aimed at connecting all households and enterprises to a broadband network, 
despite the fact that Korea Telecom had suffered from stagnant revenues and decreasing 
profits since competition was introduced (Korea Telecom, 2001). As the first step in 
constructing an information superhighway all over the country, Korea Telecom 
constructed a fiber optic telecommunications network with 367 ATM switches in 144 
areas and provided all state-owned and public institutions with broadband network 
service by August, 2000 (Jeong, 2004; Korea Telecom, 2001). Since 2005, Korea has 
begun to upgrade its circuit-based backbone networks to all Internet Protocol (IP)-based 
backbone networks in order to integrate wired, wireless, and high-speed Internet 
backbone networks. The IP-based integrated backbone networks are currently expected to 
be constructed by the mid-2010s, and will provide 100Mbps wired broadband network 
service and 10Mbps wireless broadband network service (The Electronic Times, 2009).       
In addition to its contributions to the construction of the broadband infrastructure, 
the obligation of providing Internet to rural areas was also imposed on Korea Telecom 
because other private telecommunications enterprises were reluctant to provide 
broadband network service to rural areas which were not lucrative to them. Thus, it was 
taken for granted that the state-owned service provider will take the responsibility for 
investing in unprofitable rural areas to provide the Internet for the promotion of the 
public interest. In these circumstances, Korea Telecom was used as an effective vehicle to 
implement the government‘s universal service policies for broadband network service 
without fair compensation for the losses caused by providing it to rural areas. This 
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became one of the major factors behind the rapid growth of broadband penetration in 
Korea.      
Despite the fact that there were no universal service mechanisms or funding for 
broadband network service, Korea was able to implement its universal service policies 
for the Internet with little worry about funding resources because the government had a 
major stake in Korea Telecom and compensation for Korea Telecom‘s losses from 
providing the Internet to high cost areas was not a big concern, before Korea Telecom 
was privatized (Jeong, 2004; Korea Telecom, 2007). In effect, the obligations of universal 
service for the Internet, such as the construction of infrastructure and providing 
broadband network service to rural areas at affordable rates, were also largely imposed on 
the state-owned telecommunications service provider even after competition.  
In Korea, despite the introduction of competition and the emergence of private 
telecommunications enterprises, universal service was still initiated and led by the 
government instead of market forces. In particular, the government utilized the state-
owned telecommunications enterprise as an effective and useful vehicle for its policy 
goals even after full-scale competition was introduced. In this process, the obligations of 
universal service for the telephone and the Internet were asymmetrically imposed on the 
state-owned service provider largely because of one of the government‘s major goals in 
telecommunications was the enhancement of the new entrants‘ competitiveness against 
Korea Telecom. As a result, the introduction of full-scale competition did not terminate 
Korea Telecom‘s support for universal service through its internal cross-subsidy.  
To summarize, the most important feature of the evolution of universal service in 
Korea is that competition did not terminate Korea Telecom‘s status as the main universal 
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service provider. In contrast to most other countries‘ cases where the former monopolies 
accepted asymmetric regulation only under protest, or when they were allowed other 
attractive inducements – such as the permission to enter long-distance in the United 
States, Korea Telecom, as a state-owned enterprise, acquiesced in the asymmetric 
regulation even after the introduction of competition until its ownership change. Before 
privatization, Korea Telecom was still regarded as the government-run enterprise with a 
duty to promote social welfare, and it had the financial resources and capabilities to 
contribute to social objectives, such as universal service. For instance, despite losses from 
universal service, the average of Korea Telecom‘s annual net profits was $672 million 
during 1995 ~ 2002 (KISDI, 2006; Korea Telecom, 2006), which enabled Korea Telecom 
to provide financial support for implementing the government‘s agenda in 
telecommunications, such as universal service. But once Korea Telecom was privatized, 
this system proved to be no longer sustainable.  
 
Conclusions 
This case study of Korea contradicts the expectations from literature that network 
expansion cannot be achieved under the state-owned monopoly, and that the introduction 
of competition results in calls for universal service. Thus, we may need to reconsider the 
popular conception that a state-owned monopoly in a developing country is inherently 
unable to implement teledensity growth and universal service. The Korean case indicates 
that teledensity growth as well as regionally balanced network expansion could be 
successfully achieved under a state-owned monopoly. The inability of state-owned 
monopolies to effect network growth may instead be the result of a deliberate political 
 23 
 
choice to keep rates low, in implicit recognition of the state-owned enterprise‘s role as a 
public service provider: consequently, state-owned monopolies in developing countries 
are perpetually starved of funds, and the low subscription prices contribute to high 
demand and long waiting lists. Korea avoided these twin problems by letting rates re-
adjust during the monopoly period itself.  
From this perspective, market-oriented reform is not the sole solution for 
developing countries to pursue the development of their telecommunications sector. 
However, it should also be pointed out that Korea‘s case is exceptional in the sense that 
the high economic growth rates during the 1960s and 1970s increased household incomes 
and made the subscription-rate readjustments more palatable, enabling Korea Telecom to 
raise capital domestically. Other developing countries not so fortunately placed may still 
face constraints in raising capital internally, and may have no recourse but privatization 
or international investment. In this regard, some may argue that the most effective 
universal service policy is to increase overall economic growth—but that is often 
‗exogenous‘ to telecommunications policy debates.  
Secondly, the Korean case implies that a state-owned telecommunications 
enterprise can successfully advance a government‘s policy priorities such as universal 
service, even after the introduction of competition if its operating performance is good 
enough to contribute financial resources to social objectives. After competition was 
introduced to telecommunications, Korea was able to achieve the rapid development of 
the broadband network infrastructure and secure universal service for high speed Internet 
and telephone, utilizing Korea Telecom‘s large net profits.  
Thirdly, the Korean case demonstrates that the universal service policies are most 
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effective when they rely on a combination of public support for network deployment, 
reasonable rates and pro-active government policy. Programs such as the IT IS and the 
WA for telephone service and the KII Project for the Internet have played a major role in 
promoting the rapid development of network infrastructure. Korea also did not depend on 
affordability as the primary driver of penetration increases: by allowing rates to increase 
to reasonable levels and permitting installation costs to be collected through telephone 
bonds, Korea ensured viable long-term network growth. Pro-active universal service 
policies enabled Korea to provide broadband infrastructure to 99 percent of all Korean 
households by 2007, including those in rural and isolated areas (Korea Telecom, 2007). 
As Frieden (2005) points out, Korea might not have been able to implement the 
regionally balanced broadband networks in such a short period, without the universal 
service policies led by the government because the private sector, without compensation 
or incentive, tends to avoid constructing the network infrastructure in rural areas which 
are unattractive markets.  
The events we have described in this paper prefigure later developments such as 
the privatization of Korea Telecom and the rise of intense competition in broadband that 
was to develop in the 21
st
 century. It may be argued that, in the interest of completeness, 
these events should have been included within the scope of this case study. However, 
broadening the historical canvas would have necessarily implied a dilution of our focus 
on critical management and policy choices made by KT and the government in the pre-
privatization period while lengthening the present work beyond the scope of a journal 
article. We have however dealt with these events in greater detail elsewhere (Kim, 2009), 
and intend to return to it in future work. 
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Ultimately, every case study is unique, and so is this one. Korea‘s experiences 
may not be directly replicable in any other developing country. If Korea‘s high economic 
growth rates made domestic capital formation a viable option, the particular governance 
arrangements in that country, specifically the government-corporate partnership, enabled 
unique modes of program implementation. In spite of this limitation, this study may 
provide policy-makers and scholars in telecommunications with alternative pathways to 
achieving similar policy goals. The available options on the policy menu for developing 
countries might be competition or privatization. But other recipes too might be possible, 
for developing countries depending on their tastes, as the Korean case demonstrates. 
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Table 1: Funding for the KTA‘s investment during 1981~1987             (Unit: %)    
 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Internal financing 44.9 44.1 54.7 66.1 72.1 73.4 75.9 
External 
financing 
Foreign 
investment 
20.1 23.0 15.8 7.9 3.7 1.2 - 
Telephone 
bonds 
15.8 11.0 12.9 11.4 11.9 12.7 11.2 
Installation 
fees 
19.2 13.4 16.6 14.3 12.1 12.5 12.1 
(Source: MOC, 1998)                                              
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Table 2: Losses incurred by providing local call service to high cost areas 
 
Year Losses (A) 
Levy imposed on service 
providers (B) 
Losses not 
compensated 
for (A-B) Korea Telecom 
Other service 
providers 
2000 479.4 0 0 479.4 
2001 363.2 0  0 363.2 
2002 349.2 51.5 105.6 192.1 
2003 451.2 13.7 29.6 407.9 
2004 274.8 0 0 274.8 
2005 210.5 0  0 210.5 
Total 2128.3 65.2 135.2 1927.9 
(Source: Korea Telecom, 2007)                      (Unit: million dollars) 
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Table 3: Losses incurred by public phone service 
 
Year Losses (A) 
Levy imposed on service 
providers (B) 
Losses not 
compensated 
for (A-B) Korea Telecom 
Other service 
providers 
2000 201.5 14.7 25.6 161.5 
2001 146.2 12.5 24.0 109.7 
2002 85.9 9.9 20.2 55.8 
2003 81.0 16.1 34.9 30.0 
2004 73.4 13.6 31.1 28.7 
2005 80.5 14.6 36.1 29.8 
Total 668.5 81.5 171.8 415.1 
(Source: Korea Telecom, 2007)                      (Unit: million dollars) 
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Table 4: Losses incurred by universal service                  (Unit: million dollars) 
 
Year Losses (A) 
Levy imposed on service 
providers (B) 
Losses not 
compensated 
for (A-B) Korea Telecom 
Other service 
providers 
2000 728.2 29.0 50.3 648.9 
2001 551.5 26.1 50.3 475.1 
2002 469.2 72.0 147.4 249.8 
2003 560.5 38.2 82.7 439.6 
2004 368.4 20.3 46.2 301.9 
2005 314.0 21.0 51.7 241.3 
Total 2991.8 206.6 428.6 2356.6 
(Source: Korea Telecom, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
